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Abstract The paper introduces and discusses the concept of pu-dominance in the
context of finite games in normal form. It then presents the pu-dominance criterion for
equilibrium selection. The pu-dominance criterion is inspired by and closely related to
the p-dominance criterion originally proposed by Morris et al. (Econometrica 63:145–
157, 1995). However, there are games in which the two criteria lead to different refine-
ments. We provide sufficient conditions under which equilibrium selection through pu-
dominance is weakly finer (respectively, coarser) than equilibrium selection through
p-dominance.
Keywords Equilibrium selection · Normal form games · pu-Dominance ·
p-Dominance
JEL Classification C72 · C73
1 Introduction
Multiplicity of equilibria is a feature that characterizes many strategic interactions. A
typical example is a coordination game where multiple pure strategy Nash equilibria
occur when players’ actions match. Whenever multiple equilibria exist, equilibrium
selection obviously becomes a key issue, both from a normative and a positive point
of view (Kim 1996; Haruvy and Stahl 2007).
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In this paper, we introduce the concept of pu-dominance and use it as a criterion
for equilibrium selection in the context of finite one-shot simultaneous games. In a
nutshell, the pu-dominance criterion selects the equilibrium whose supporting actions
turn out to be pu-dominant for the less stringent set of beliefs. More precisely, we
say that an equilibrium is pu-dominant for the vector pu = (p1, . . . , pn) if, for every
player i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i’s equilibrium action best responds to any conjecture according
to which any player j = i plays his equilibrium action with probability of at least pi
and uniformly randomizes the remaining probability over his alternative actions.1
In terms of its “microfoundations”, pu-dominance thus mimics the mental process
according to which every agent evaluates the likelihood of an equilibrium by focusing
on the probability of the actions that sustain it, while assuming a streamlined uniform
distribution for what concerns the other players’ alternative actions. Such an approach
can be the result of bounded rationality or can stem from a conscious consideration
of the player. In this respect, pu-dominance postulates a behavior that is consistent
with the one that the so-called “wordly” archetype of players would implement (for
experimental evidence about the incidence of this archetype of players see Stahl and
Wilson 1995; Haruvy and Stahl 2007; Weizsäcker 2003): play best response to a prior
based on a belief that a fraction of the population chooses the equilibrium strategy
(so called naive-Nash type) while the remaining part uniformly randomizes over all
strategies (level-0 type).
Notice also that, by construction, the pu-dominance criterion evaluates an equi-
librium in light of a conjecture that assigns positive probability to the event that the
opponents deviate and do not play their corresponding equilibrium action. As such,
pu-dominance considers not only the profitability of playing a certain equilibrium
action but also its riskiness. The pu-dominance criterion thus tackles the issue of equi-
librium selection using the same intuition that underlies the well-known concepts of
risk-dominance (Harsanyi and Selten 1988) and p-dominance (Morris et al. 1995;
Kajii and Morris 1997): if multiple equilibria exist and agents do not know which
equilibrium will arise, they will coordinate their expectations on the one that better
solves the trade-off between risk and return.
In the second part of the paper, we more thoroughly investigate the relationships
that exist between pu-dominance, risk-dominance, and p-dominance. We show that the
pu-dominance criterion and the risk-dominance criterion coincide in any 2×2 games,
but pu-dominance is a more general concept, as it can also be applied to games that
have more than two players. We then compare pu-dominance and p-dominance. The
two concepts are clearly similar in their approach (pu-dominance is actually inspired
by p-dominance) but they may lead to different conclusions in terms of equilibrium
selection. We show in fact that there exist games in which the pu-dominance criterion
leads to a finer selection (i.e., it sensibly discriminates among equilibria that the p-
dominance criterion deems equal) as well as games in which the opposite holds true.
1 The fact that the conjecture posits that players use a uniform distribution to randomize over the actions
that do not belong to the profile under scrutiny explains the subscript “u” in the term “pu -dominance”.
This should not be confused with the concept of u-dominance Kojima (2006) that has been proposed as a
criterion for equilibrium selection based on perfect foresight dynamics and that assumes that the number
of opponents adopting a certain strategy follows a uniform distribution.
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We then provide sufficient conditions that discriminate between the two cases and at
the same time ensure that the pu-dominance criterion selects a unique equilibrium.
2 The concept of pu-dominance
Consider a generic one-shot simultaneous game G = 〈N , (Ai )i∈N , (ui )i∈N
〉
where
N = {1, . . . , n} with n ≥ 2 denotes the set of players, Ai =
{
a1, . . . , aki
}
with
ki ≥ 2 is the action space of player i ∈ N , and ui : A → R is the payoff function with
A = × j∈N A j . As usual, a profile a∗ ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium of G if the relation
ui (a
∗
i , a
∗−i ) ≥ ui
(
ai , a
∗−i
)
holds for every i ∈ N and every ai ∈ Ai .
Now take any action profile aˆ and define the vector pu(aˆ) =
(
p1(aˆ), . . . , pn(aˆ)
)
.
The vector pu(aˆ) assigns to every player i ∈ N a specific conjecture about what every
other agent will play (i.e., a probability distribution defined on every A j for j = i).
More precisely, pu(aˆ) postulates that each agent i ∈ N believes that any other player
j ∈ N−i will play action aˆ j with probability pi (aˆ) and any other action a j = aˆ j with
probability (1−pi (aˆ))k j −1 .
We then say that the action profile aˆ is pu-dominant for pu(aˆ) =
(
p1(aˆ), . . . , pn(aˆ)
)
if, for any player i ∈ N and any j ∈ N−i , action aˆi is a best response to any probability
distribution λ
(
aˆ
) ∈ (A−i ) that assigns at least probability pi (aˆ) to the event of j
playing action aˆ j and lets j uniformly to randomize with the remaining probability
over his alternative actions.
Definition 1 Action profile aˆ ∈ A is pu-dominant with pu(aˆ) =
(
p1(aˆ), . . . , pn(aˆ)
)
if for all i ∈ N , ai = aˆi and all λ
(
aˆ
) ∈ (A−i ) with λ
(
aˆ j
) ≥ pi (aˆ) and λ
(
a j
) =
(1−λ(aˆ j))
k j −1 for all a j = aˆ j and every j ∈ N−i ,
∑
a−i ∈A−i
λ (a−i ) ui
(
aˆi , a−i
) ≥
∑
a−i ∈A−i
λ (a−i ) ui (ai , a−i ) . (1)
Some basic concepts in game theory can be formulated in terms of pu-dominance.
For instance, an equilibrium in dominant strategies is pu-dominant with pu(a∗) =
(0, . . . , 0). In contrast, there is no vector pu for which a profile that contains dominated
actions can turn out to be pu-dominant.
Focusing on Nash equilibria in pure strategies, every equilibrium is pu-dominant
with pu(a∗) = (1, . . . , 1): notice in fact that with such a (degenerate) vector of proba-
bility distributions, the definition of pu-dominance boils down to the requirement that
every action in the profile under scrutiny is a best response to the actions taken by the
other players, i.e., the definition of a Nash equilibrium. However, an equilibrium a∗ is
in general pu-dominant also for some other vectors pu(a∗) ≤ (1, . . . , 1). More pre-
cisely, if the equilibrium a∗ is pu-dominant with pu(a∗), then a∗ is also pu-dominant
for any p′u(a∗) ≥ pu(a∗).
Whenever multiple equilibria exist and the set of equilibria is given by A∗ =
{a∗1, . . . , a∗} with  ≥ 2, what characterizes a specific equilibrium a∗ψ ∈ A∗ is
the smallest pu(a∗ψ) for which a∗ψ turns out to be pu-dominant. This vector, which we
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indicate with p¯u(a∗ψ) = ( p¯1(a∗ψ), . . . , p¯n(a∗ψ)), reports the smallest probabilities
p¯i (a∗ψ) for which a∗ψi is a (weak) best response to the associated conjecture λ¯(a∗ψ)
with λ¯(a∗ψj ) = p¯i (a∗ψ) and λ¯(a j ) =
(
1− p¯i (a∗ψ)
)
k j −1 for all a j = a
∗ψ
j and j ∈ N−i . As
such, p¯i (a∗ψ) provides a measure of the riskiness of playing the equilibrium action a∗ψi
as well as a tool to identify the equilibrium upon which players’ expectations should
coordinate. In particular, and in the same spirit of the sufficient p-dominance condition
introduced by Kajii and Morris (1997) for the identification of robust equilibria, the
pu-dominance criterion selects the equilibrium (or the subset of equilibria, Sect. 3 will
investigate the conditions under which uniqueness is ensured) a∗∗ ∈ A∗ for which the
following relation holds:
n∑
i=1
p¯i (a∗∗) ≤
n∑
i=1
p¯i (a∗ψ) for any a∗ψ ∈ A∗ (2)
In other words, the pu-dominance criterion selects the equilibrium whose supporting
actions emerge as pu-dominant under the less stringent set of beliefs. Notice that if
the game is symmetric requirement (2) holds if and only if p¯u(a∗∗) ≤ p¯u(a∗ψ) for
any a∗ψ ∈ A∗.
As an example, consider the following 3 × 3 coordination game where the action
space of player i ∈ {A, B, C} is given by Ai = {H, M, L}. Player A chooses the row,
player B chooses the column, and player C chooses the matrix. In each cell payoffs
appear in the order u A, u B and uC .
aC = H
aB= H aB= M aB= L
aA = H 3, 3, 3 2, 0, 2 0, 1, 2
aA = M 0, 2, 2 0, 0, 2 2, 3, 1
aA = L 1, 2, 0 3, 2, 1 1, 1, 1
aC = M
aB= H aB= M aB= L
aA = H 2, 2, 0 2, 0, 0 1, 3, 2
aA = M 0, 2, 0 3, 3, 3 2, 1, 2
aA = L 3, 1, 2 1, 2, 2 0, 0, 1
aC = L
aB= H aB= M aB= L
aA = H 2, 0, 1 1, 2, 3 1, 1, 1
aA = M 2, 1, 3 2, 2, 1 1, 0, 0
aA = L 1, 1, 1 0, 1, 0 3, 3, 3
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The game has three Nash equilibria: a∗1 = (H, H, H), a∗2 = (M, M, M), and
a∗3 = (L , L , L). These equilibria are Pareto equivalent such that the Pareto domi-
nance criterion (i.e., the criterion that selects the Pareto superior equilibrium with the
argument that this is the outcome upon which agents’ expectations should converge)
does not refine the set A∗.
The pu-dominance criterion selects instead a specific equilibrium. To find it,
one needs to compute for every equilibrium a∗ψ with ψ ∈ {1, 2, 3} the functions
E(a∗ψi |λ(a∗ψ)), i.e., the expected payoff of action a∗ψi conditional on player i’s con-
jecture λ(a∗ψ) that postulates that each opponent j ∈ N−i plays action a∗ψj with
probability λ(a∗ψj ) = pi and each of his alternative actions a j = a∗ψj with probabil-
ity λ(a j ) = 1−pi2 . Then, by imposing the conditions E(a∗ψi |λ(a∗ψ)) ≥ E(ai |λ(a∗ψ))
for any ai = a∗ψi , we find the components of the vector p¯u which is the smallest vector
for which the equilibrium a∗ψ is pu-dominant. Finally, we apply the pu-dominance
criterion and select the equilibrium characterized by the smallest p¯u .
For instance, starting from the equilibrium a∗1 and focusing without loss of gen-
erality on player A (the game is symmetric), we have the following: E(H |λ(a∗1)) =
5
4 p
2
i + 12 pi + 54 , E(M |λ(a∗1)) = −2pi + 2, and E(L|λ(a∗1)) = −2p2i + 2pi + 1.
Therefore, the equilibrium action H dominates action M for any pi ≥ 0.265 and
action L for any pi ≥ 0. Given that similar relations also hold for players B and
C , a∗1 is pu-dominant with p¯u(a∗1) = (0.265, 0.265, 0.265). Similar computations
show that a∗2 is pu-dominant with p¯u(a∗2) = (0.547, 0.547, 0.547) while a∗3 is pu-
dominant with p¯u(a∗3) = (0.771, 0.771, 0.771). The pu-dominance criterion thus
unambiguously selects equilibrium a∗1 = (H, H, H).
3 pu-dominance, risk-dominance and p-dominance
In this section, we investigate the relationships that exist between the pu-dominance
criterion and the risk-dominance (Harsanyi and Selten 1988) and p-dominance (Morris
et al. 1995; Kajii and Morris 1997) criteria. In the course of the analysis, we also explore
how pu-dominance relates to mixed strategies equilibria.
Proposition 1 In any 2 × 2 coordination game, the pu-dominance criterion always
selects the risk-dominant equilibrium.
Proof Consider a generic 2 × 2 coordination game with i ∈ {A, B} and Ai = {H, L}
with a > c, d > b, e > f and h > g.
aB = H aB = L
aA = H a, e b, f
aA = L c, g d, h
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The equilibrium a∗1 =(H, H) is pu-dominant with p¯u(a∗1)=
(
d−b
a−c+d−b ,
h−g
e− f +h−g
)
,
while a∗2 = (L , L) is pu-dominant with p¯u(a∗2) =
(
a−c
a−c+d−b ,
e− f
e− f +h−g
)
. There-
fore, the pu-dominant criterion selects a∗1 if d−ba−c+d−b <
a−c
a−c+d−b and
h−g
e− f +h−g <
e− f
e− f +h−g , i.e., if a − c > d − b and e − f > h − g. But if both conditions are valid
then (a − c) (e − f ) > (d − b) (h − g), i.e., a∗1 is the risk-dominant equilibrium
because it is the equilibrium characterized by the highest product of the deviation
losses. Similarly, if the pu-dominant criterion selects a∗2, then it must be the case
that (d − b) (h − g) > (a − c) (e − f ) which means that a∗2 is the risk-dominant
equilibrium. 	unionsq
The proof of Proposition 1 provides an example of a relation that holds more
generally in any 2 × 2 game with two equilibria in pure strategies: if an equilib-
rium a∗ψ ∈ {a∗1, a∗2} is pu-dominant with p¯u(a∗ψ) =
(
p¯1(a∗ψ), p¯2(a∗ψ)
)
, then
p¯i (a∗ψ) = q j where q j is the probability that defines the mixed-strategy equilibrium
of the game:
(
q1a
∗ψ
1 + (1 − q1) a1, q2a∗ψ2 + (1 − q2) a2
)
with ai = a∗ψi . The intu-
ition is the following: in a mixed-strategy equilibrium, agents randomize in such a way
as to make the other player indifferent about what to play. This means that if player i
attaches probability p¯i (a∗ψ) = q j to the event of j playing action a∗ψj [and thus prob-
ability
(
1 − p¯i (a∗ψ)
) = (1 − q j
)
to the event of j playing a j given that k j − 1 = 1],
then both actions in Ai are best responses for player i . However, for any q ′j > q j ,
action a∗ψi becomes player i’s unique best response. It follows that the equilibrium
a∗ψ is pu-dominant with p¯u(a∗ψ) =
(
p¯1(a∗ψ), p¯2(a∗ψ)
)
where p¯1(a∗ψ) = q2 and
p¯2(a∗ψ) = q1.
We now move to a comparison between the pu-dominance criterion and the p-
dominance criterion. As defined in Morris et al. (1995) for the case with two players
and then extended by Kajii and Morris (1997) to the many players case, an equilibrium
a∗ is p-dominant with p(a∗) = (p1(a∗), . . . , pn(a∗)) if, for any agent i ∈ N , action
a∗i is a best response to any probability distribution λ(a∗) ∈ (A−i ) such that λ(a∗j ) ≥
pi (a∗) for any j = i .2 In other words, action a∗i is p-dominant if it maximizes player
i’s expected payoff whenever i thinks that each one of the other players will play
with probability not smaller than pi (a∗), his component of the equilibrium profile.
The difference with respect to pu-dominance is that p-dominance does not require
the remaining probability (1 − λ(a∗j )) to follow any particular distribution over the
alternative actions a j = a∗j . While at first sight p-dominance may seem a more general
concept with respect to pu-dominance, notice that every Nash equilibrium is always
simultaneously p-dominant for some p as well as pu-dominant for some pu . What may
differ across the two concepts are the smallest probability vectors p¯ (a∗) and p¯u (a∗)
for which the equilibrium is dominant.
2 Tercieux (2006a, b) further extends the concept of p-dominance by introducing the notion of p-best
response set: a set profile S = (S1, . . . , Sn) is a p-best response set if for every i the set Si contains an
action that best responds to any conjecture that assigns probability of at least pi to the event that other
players select their action from S−i .
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Proposition 2 Let a∗ be a pure Nash equilibrium of the game G. Then a∗ is p-
dominant with p¯ (a∗) as well as pu-dominant with p¯u (a∗) and the relation p¯u (a∗) ≤
p¯ (a∗) holds.
Proof In the appendix. 	unionsq
Proposition 2 clarifies the relationship that exists between the p¯ (a∗) and p¯u (a∗)
vectors that characterize any Nash equilibrium. However, one thing is the definition
and the computation of these vectors: a different issue is how p-dominance and pu-
dominance perform in terms of equilibrium selection. The two criteria in fact do not
always lead to the same solution. More precisely, there exist games in which the
pu-dominance criterion discriminates among equilibria that on the contrary the p-
dominance criterion deems equivalent (see Example 1 below) as well as games in
which the opposite holds true (see Example 2 later).
Example 1 Consider the following game:
aB = H aB= M aB= L
aA = H 4,4 2,3 0,0
aA = M 3,2 0,0 2,0
aA = L 0,0 0,2 4,4
The game has two Nash equilibria: a∗1 = (H, H) and a∗2 = (L , L). Both equi-
libria are p-dominant with p¯
(
a∗1
) = p¯ (a∗2)= ( 12 , 12
)
. The p-dominant criterion
thus does not refine the set of equilibria. On the contrary, a∗1 is pu-dominant with
p¯u
(
a∗1
)= ( 15 , 15
)
while a∗2 is pu-dominant with p¯u
(
a∗1
)= ( 37 , 37
)
. Therefore, the
pu-dominance criterion unambiguously selects the equilibrium a∗1 = (H, H).
In the game of Example 1, equilibrium selection through pu-dominance is thus
more effective with respect to a selection based on p-dominance. And indeed, given
the overall structure of the game, the selection of a∗1 = (H, H) seems a sensible
prediction: a∗1 and a∗2 are in fact Pareto equivalent but action ai = H is more
rewarding/less risky.
More in general the intuition as to why in some games the pu-dominance criterion
manages to discriminate among equilibria that the p-dominance criterion judges as
equal is the following. The pu-dominance conjecture assigns to every player a belief
system that attaches positive probability to the occurrence of any action that belongs to
the action space of the opponents. On the contrary, the p-dominance conjecture does
not. The p-dominance conjecture stems in fact from a worst-case scenario analysis that
requires the equilibrium action under scrutiny (a∗i ) to dominate any alternative action
(ai = a∗i ) even under the most unfavorable probability distribution. This distribution
is the one that allocates all the available probability (1 − p¯i (a∗)) to the occurrence of
the action(s) a˜ j for any j = i where a˜ j is the action that supports the profile for which
the payoff difference ui (ai , a˜−i ) − ui (a∗i , a˜−i ) is maximal. As such the p-dominance
conjecture attaches zero probability to the event that an opponent plays action a j = a′j
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with a′j ∈ {a∗j , a˜ j }. The conjecture thus disregards some of the opponents’ actions and
therefore it ignores the associated payoffs.3 In other words, p-dominance captures less
information with respect to pu-dominance. However, while in general this is a positive
feature of pu-dominance as it means that the pu-dominance criterion better captures
the inherent structure of the strategic situation under study, the consequences of this
fact in terms of equilibrium selection can go in both directions. In fact, and as it has
already been mentioned, there also exist games in which the p-dominance criterion
selects a unique equilibrium while the pu-dominance criterion does not.
Example 2 Consider the following game:
aB= H aB= M aB= L
aA = H 4,4 2,2 0,0
aA = M 2,2 0,0 1,3
aA = L 0,0 3,1 3,3
The game has two Nash equilibria: a∗1 = (H, H) and a∗2 = (L , L). The a∗1 equi-
librium is p-dominant with p¯
(
a∗1
)= ( 37 , 37
)
while the a∗2 equilibrium is p-dominant
with p¯
(
a∗2
)= ( 47 , 47
)
. The p-dominant criterion thus selects the equilibrium a∗1 =
(H, H). Both equilibria are also pu -dominant with p¯u
(
a∗1
) = p¯u
(
a∗2
)= ( 13 , 13
)
such that in this case the pu-dominance criterion does refine the set of equilibria.
In what follows we focus on symmetric games and provide a sufficient condition
that ensures that the pu-dominance criterion selects a unique equilibrium. Therefore,
the same condition also guarantees that equilibrium selection through pu-dominance is
weakly finer than a selection through p-dominance. As an intermediary result, Lemma
1 shows that whenever the pu-dominance criterion selects multiple equilibria then it
must be the case that all the selected equilibria are pu-dominant with p¯u =
( 1
k , . . . ,
1
k
)
where k = ∣∣A j
∣∣ for any j ∈ N is the number of actions at player j’s disposal.
Proposition 3 then specifies the above-mentioned sufficient condition.
Lemma 1 Let A∗ = {a∗1, . . . , a∗} with  ≥ 2 be the set of Nash equilibria of
a symmetric game G with k actions for each player. If the pu-dominance criterion
selects the set of equilibria A∗∗ = {a∗∗1, . . . , a∗∗} with  ≥ 2 and A∗∗ ⊆ A∗ then
p¯u(a∗∗φ) =
( 1
k , . . . ,
1
k
) for any a∗∗φ ∈ A∗∗.
Proof In the appendix. 	unionsq
Proposition 3 Let A∗ = {a∗1, . . . , a∗} with  ≥ 2 be the set of Nash equilib-
ria of a symmetric game G with k actions for each player. A sufficient condition
3 Notice that the actions that the p-dominance conjecture disregards are not necessarily dominated (see for
instance action M in the game in Example 1). Notice also that the pu -dominance conjecture suffers instead
from the opposite problem as it assigns positive probability to the event that the opponents play strictly
dominated actions (if these exist). Still, this shortcoming can be easily fixed by applying the pu -dominance
criterion only after the elimination of all strictly dominated actions.
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for the pu-dominance criterion to select a unique equilibrium a∗∗ ∈ A∗ is that∑
a−i ∈A−i ui (a
∗ψ
i , a−i ) =
∑
a−i ∈A−i ui (a
∗ξ
i , a−i ) for any a∗ψi and a∗ξi = a∗ψi .
Proof In the appendix. 	unionsq
4 Conclusions
This paper introduced the concept of pu-dominance and proposed the pu-dominance
criterion as a tool to refine multiple equilibria in normal form games. The criterion
selects the equilibrium (or the set of equilibria) whose supporting actions are pu-
dominant under the less stringent set of beliefs. The intuition for such a choice is
that the selected equilibrium is the one that better solves the trade-off between the
profitability of the equilibrium outcome and the riskiness of playing the supporting
action in case some of the opponents deviate. The paper also explored the tight con-
nections that exist between pu-dominance and p-dominance (Morris et al. 1995; Kajii
and Morris 1997). The two concepts are clearly similar in their premises as well as in
their scope but we feel pu-dominance presents some advantages. First, pu-dominance
relies on a conjecture that is more in line with the actual behavior of a relevant fraction
inexperienced players (so called “wordly” archetype). Second, it is more easily com-
putable. In particular, one does not need to identify the most unfavorable distribution
that defines p-dominance, a task that may turn out to be not so trivial especially in
games that involve more than two players and/or actions. Finally, pu-dominance more
fully captures the inherent structure of the game under study as it takes into account
any possible deviation of the other players.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
If a∗ is a Nash equilibrium of G, then there exists at least one vector for which a∗
is p-dominant. In particular, a∗ is certainly p-dominant for p(a∗) = (1, . . . , 1). It
follows that the vector p¯(a∗) = ( p¯1(a∗), . . . , p¯n(a∗)) also exists where, for any i and
any j = i , p¯i (a∗) is the smallest probability for which action a∗i best responds to any
conjecture λ(a∗) ∈ (A−i ) according to which λ(a∗j ) ≥ p¯i (a∗) while the remaining
probability (1−λ(a∗j )) can follow any distribution on actions a j = a∗j . The conjecture
thus includes the situation in which λ(a j ) = (1−λ(a
∗
j ))
k j −1 for any j = i , a j = a∗j and
k j =
∣∣A j
∣∣
. Therefore, if a∗ is p-dominant with p¯(a∗) then a∗ is also pu-dominant
with pu(a∗) = p¯(a∗). Notice that if k j = 2 for any j ∈ N , then p¯u(a∗) = p¯(a∗) as
both p-dominance and pu-dominance assign probability (1 − λ(a∗j )) to the event of j
playing action a j = a∗j . Now consider the case in which k j > 2 for some j . Assume
there exists at least one action ai ∈ Ai that is not (weakly or strictly) dominated by
a∗i .4 Let a˜(ai ) = (ai , a˜−i ) be the action profile that supports the (non-necessarily
4 If an undominated action does not exist then a∗ is pu -dominant as well p-dominant with p¯u
(
a∗
) =
p¯
(
a∗
) = (0, . . . , 0).
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unique) outcome for which ui (ai , a−i ) − ui (a∗i , a−i ) > 0 is maximal. Given that
ui (ai , a
∗−i ) − ui (a∗i , a∗−i ) ≤ 0 (a∗ is a Nash equilibrium), it must be the case that in
a˜(ai ) there is at least one player j = i that plays a˜ j = a∗j . The equilibrium a∗ is
p-dominant with p¯ (a∗) = ( p¯1(a∗), . . . , p¯n(a∗)) if a∗i dominates any ai even under
the specific conjecture that assigns probability (1 − p¯i (a∗)) to the event of j playing
a˜ j = a∗j . On the other hand, a∗ is pu-dominant with p¯u (a∗) =
(
p¯′1(a∗), . . . , p¯′n(a∗)
)
if a∗i dominates any ai under the conjecture that assigns probability
( 1− p¯′i (a∗)
k j −1
)
to the
event of j playing a˜ j = a∗j . Equilibrium a∗ cannot be p-dominant with p (a∗) =
p¯u (a∗) given that (1 − p¯′i (a∗)) >
(
1− p¯′i (a∗)
k j −1
)
and the conjecture would thus assign
too much probability to the occurrence of the profile a˜(ai ). It then must be the case
that p¯′i (a∗) < p¯i (a∗). We can thus conclude that p¯u (a∗) ≤ p¯ (a∗).
Proof of Lemma 1
Without loss of generality, assume the pu-dominance criterion selects two equilibria,
i.e., let A∗∗ = {a∗∗1, a∗∗2}. By expression (2) this means:
n∑
i=1
p¯i (a∗∗1) =
n∑
i=1
p¯i (a∗∗2) (3)
The fact that G is symmetric implies that (3) reduces to p¯u(a∗∗1) = p¯u(a∗∗2), i.e.,
p¯i (a∗∗1) = p¯i (a∗∗2) for any i ∈ N . Now define the conjecture λ¯(a∗∗φ) with φ ∈ {1, 2}
such that λ¯(a∗∗φj ) = p¯i (a∗∗φ) and λ¯(a j ) = (1− p¯i (a
∗∗φ))
k−1 for all a j = a∗∗φj and for
j ∈ N−i . Let λ(φ)(a−i ) = × j∈N−1 λ¯(a∗∗φ). With the probability distribution λ(φ),
any player is by construction indifferent between playing action a∗∗φi and action a
∗∗ξ
i
with ξ ∈ {1, 2} and ξ = φ. This implies that the following two conditions must
simultaneously hold:
∑
a−i ∈A−i
λ(1) (a−i ) ui
(
a∗∗1i , a−i
)
=
∑
a−i ∈A−i
λ(1) (a−i ) ui
(
a∗∗2i , a−i
)
(4)
∑
a−i ∈A−i
λ(2) (a−i ) ui
(
a∗∗2i , a−i
)
=
∑
a−i ∈A−i
λ(2) (a−i ) ui
(
a∗∗1i , a−i
)
(5)
Therefore, the following condition also holds:
∑
a−i ∈A−i
λ(1) (a−i ) ui
(
a∗∗1i , a−i
)
−
∑
a−i ∈A−i
λ(1) (a−i ) ui
(
a∗∗2i , a−i
)
=
∑
a−i ∈A−i
λ(2) (a−i ) ui
(
a∗∗1i , a−i
)
−
∑
a−i ∈A−i
λ(2) (a−i ) ui
(
a∗∗2i , a−i
)
(6)
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Now notice that, given that by assumption A∗∗ = {a∗∗1, a∗∗2} then it must be the case
that p¯i (a∗∗1) = p¯i (a∗∗2) for any i ∈ N . Therefore,
(
1− p¯i
(
a∗∗1
))
k−1 =
(
1− p¯i
(
a∗∗2
))
k−1 for
any i ∈ N . Expression (6) thus boils down to:
⎛
⎝
(
p¯i (a∗∗1)
)n−1 −
((
1 − p¯i
(
a∗∗1
))
k − 1
)n−1⎞
⎠
(
ui
(
a∗∗1i , a∗∗1−i
)
− ui
(
a∗∗2i , a∗∗1−i
))
=
⎛
⎝
(
p¯i (a∗∗1)
)n−1 −
((
1 − p¯i
(
a∗∗1
))
k − 1
)n−1⎞
⎠
(
ui
(
a∗∗1i , a∗∗2−i
)
− ui
(
a∗∗2i , a∗∗2−i
))
(7)
The fact that a∗∗1 and a∗∗2 are Nash equilibria implies that (ui (a∗∗1i , a∗∗1−i ) −
ui (a
∗∗2
i , a
∗∗1−i )) ≥ 0 and (ui (a∗∗1i , a∗∗2−i ) − ui (a∗∗2i , a∗∗2−i )) ≤ 0 with at least one
strict inequality if at least one equilibrium is strict. Then, for expression (7) to always
hold [notice that both p¯i (a∗∗1) and
(
1− p¯i (a∗∗1)
k−1
)
are non-negative and cannot be simul-
taneously equal to zero], it must be the case that p¯i (a∗∗1) =
(
1− p¯i (a∗∗1)
k−1
)
. But since
p¯i (a∗∗1) = p¯i (a∗∗2) then the following result holds:
p¯i (a∗∗φ) =
(
1 − p¯i (a∗∗φ)
k − 1
)
for φ ∈ {1, 2} (8)
which implies p¯i (a∗∗φ) = 1k for any φ ∈ {1, 2}. Given that the choice of |A∗∗| =
2 was made without loss of generality as one can replicate the passages above for
any possible couple of equilibria that belong to A∗∗, the more general result that
p¯u(a∗∗φ) =
( 1
k , . . . ,
1
k
)
for any a∗∗φ ∈ A∗∗ = {a∗∗1, . . . , a∗∗} and  ≥ 2 easily
follows.
Proof of Proposition 3
Assume the pu-dominance criterion selects multiple equilibria. Without loss of gen-
erality, let A∗∗ = {a∗∗1, a∗∗2} be the set of selected equilibria. Then:
∑
a−i ∈A−i
λ(1) (a−i ) ui
(
a∗∗1i , a−i
)
=
∑
a−i ∈A−i
λ(1) (a−i ) ui
(
a∗∗2i , a−i
)
(9)
where λ(1) (a−i ) = × j∈N−1λ1
(
a j
)
and λ1
(
a j
) = p¯i (a∗∗1) if a j = a∗∗1j while
λ1
(
a j
) =
(
1− p¯i
(
a∗∗1
))
k−1 if a j = a∗∗1j for any j ∈ N−i . But given that a∗∗1 ∈ A∗∗
and |A∗∗| > 1, Lemma 1 implies that p¯i (a∗∗1) =
(
1− p¯i
(
a∗∗1
))
k−1 = 1k . Therefore, (9)
becomes:
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(
1
k
)n−1 ∑
a−i ∈A−i
ui (a
∗∗1
i , a−i ) =
(
1
k
)n−1 ∑
a−i ∈A−i
ui (a
∗∗2
i , a−i ) (10)
which necessarily requires:
∑
a−i ∈A−i
ui (a
∗∗1
i , a−i ) =
∑
a−i ∈A−i
ui (a
∗∗2
i , a−i ). (11)
It follows that if the above condition does not hold then a∗∗1 and a∗∗1 cannot simulta-
neously belong to A∗∗. Therefore, a sufficient condition for the pu-dominance criterion
to select a unique equilibrium is that the sum of an agent’s individual payoffs across
any equilibrium action differs. More formally:
∑
a−i ∈A−i
ui (a
∗ψ
i , a−i ) =
∑
a−i ∈A−i
ui (a
∗ξ
i , a−i ) for any a
∗ψ
i , a
∗ξ
i ∈ A∗ and a∗ψi = a∗ξi
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